Washington imposes dominance in South America with new ‘Donroe Doctrine’
iframe{max-width:100% !important;} img{height:auto !important; max-width:100% !important;} Alida Nehme
Since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine declared the United States would not tolerate other countries’ interference in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. foreign policy has treated the area as a core sphere of regional influence.
Under the Trump administration, this regional primacy is being enforced more aggressively under what some have dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine”. The Trump administration’s strategic goal in South America, with what they dubbed a ““Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine”, is to limit as much as possible any influence from "non-hemispheric" competitors. With this new strategy, Washington’s attention shifts to reasserting U.S. dominance over Latin America.
This precedent for imposing regional control has a long history, becoming pronounced during the Cold War with U.S.-backed coups and interventions and covert operations in countries like Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Cuba, aimed at containing Soviet influence.
Today, Washington’s main strategic competitor in the region is not Russia but China, and the battleground more economic than ideological. China's strategy in Latin America has largely relied on economic integration rather than military presence. Over the past two decades, China has become one of South America’s largest trading partners, investing heavily in infrastructure, telecommunication, mining, and ports. At the same time, U.S. foreign policy is prioritizing economic primacy in the region.
The Panama Canal illustrates this competition. Weeks into Trump’s presidency, Hong Kong–based CK Hutchinson agreed to sell its majority stake in two canal ports to BlackRock for $23 billion amid sustained U.S. pressure on Panama to reduce Chinese influence. The sale followed years of growing Chinese investment after Panama joined the Belt and Road initiative, China’s sweeping global infrastructure initiative with projects in over 150 countries, which Panama left in early 2025. Great powers also jostle for natural resources, and Venezuela, home to the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, has become a focal point in this battle. As U.S. sanctions isolated Caracas, China emerged as its largest oil customer and a major lender, deepening Venezuela’s economic dependence.
Washington therefore sought to reassert its influence over the country’s political and energy sectors, most significantly through its abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in early 2026.
While Trump and his administration justified the operation with claims of security concerns and drug trafficking, they also repeatedly stated that Venezuelan oil was a strategic objective for the intervention. They also announced that following the abduction, the U.S. would oversee Venezuela while American oil companies invest in and manage the country's oil infrastructure. Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, announced a 50-million-barrel oil supply deal with the U.S. less than three weeks after Maduro's capture. Venezuela’s role as Cuba’s primary energy supplier made its energy sector important beyond Caracas itself. Cuba, a prime challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War, has relied heavily on Venezuelan oil shipments to sustain its economy in the face of U.S. sanctions. Following Maduro’s removal, the U.S. increased pressure on Cuba by imposing a crippling oil blockade, going so far as to intercept fuel tankers in open waters.Alongside this economic doctrine is the Trump administration's military action against what the U.S. sees as regional security threats. The U.S. has carried out at least 64 strikes against Venezuelan vessels in the Caribbean, killing over 200 people. Narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and illegal migration are frequently cited, often referred to under the term “narco-terrorism”. These concerns provide a security framework for expanding U.S. influence in the region, similar to how anti-communism shaped Cold War-era interventions.
Beyond these confrontations, Washington also exercises influence through governments more aligned with U.S. objectives. Trump maintains close political alliances with Argentine President Javier Milei and El Salvador President Nayib Bukele. Milei shifted away from BRICS in favor of closer economic ties to the U.S. Bukele's alliance with the U.S. is centered on mass deportation strategies—for example, when he opened the doors of El Salvador's mega-prison, CECOT, to hundreds of deportees sent by the Trump administration.
Taken together, these developments suggest a broad evolution in international politics, one where superpowers maintain competing regional domains, as China curates its own hemispheric sphere of influence in Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine declared the United States would not tolerate other countries’ interference in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. foreign policy has treated the area as a core sphere of regional influence.
Under the Trump administration, this regional primacy is being enforced more aggressively under what some have dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine”. The Trump administration’s strategic goal in South America, with what they dubbed a ““Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine”, is to limit as much as possible any influence from "non-hemispheric" competitors. With this new strategy, Washington’s attention shifts to reasserting U.S. dominance over Latin America.
This precedent for imposing regional control has a long history, becoming pronounced during the Cold War with U.S.-backed coups and interventions and covert operations in countries like Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Cuba, aimed at containing Soviet influence.
Today, Washington’s main strategic competitor in the region is not Russia but China, and the battleground more economic than ideological. China's strategy in Latin America has largely relied on economic integration rather than military presence. Over the past two decades, China has become one of South America’s largest trading partners, investing heavily in infrastructure, telecommunication, mining, and ports. At the same time, U.S. foreign policy is prioritizing economic primacy in the region.
The Panama Canal illustrates this competition. Weeks into Trump’s presidency, Hong Kong–based CK Hutchinson agreed to sell its majority stake in two canal ports to BlackRock for $23 billion amid sustained U.S. pressure on Panama to reduce Chinese influence. The sale followed years of growing Chinese investment after Panama joined the Belt and Road initiative, China’s sweeping global infrastructure initiative with projects in over 150 countries, which Panama left in early 2025. Great powers also jostle for natural resources, and Venezuela, home to the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, has become a focal point in this battle. As U.S. sanctions isolated Caracas, China emerged as its largest oil customer and a major lender, deepening Venezuela’s economic dependence.
Washington therefore sought to reassert its influence over the country’s political and energy sectors, most significantly through its abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in early 2026.
While Trump and his administration justified the operation with claims of security concerns and drug trafficking, they also repeatedly stated that Venezuelan oil was a strategic objective for the intervention. They also announced that following the abduction, the U.S. would oversee Venezuela while American oil companies invest in and manage the country's oil infrastructure. Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, announced a 50-million-barrel oil supply deal with the U.S. less than three weeks after Maduro's capture. Venezuela’s role as Cuba’s primary energy supplier made its energy sector important beyond Caracas itself. Cuba, a prime challenge to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War, has relied heavily on Venezuelan oil shipments to sustain its economy in the face of U.S. sanctions. Following Maduro’s removal, the U.S. increased pressure on Cuba by imposing a crippling oil blockade, going so far as to intercept fuel tankers in open waters.Alongside this economic doctrine is the Trump administration's military action against what the U.S. sees as regional security threats. The U.S. has carried out at least 64 strikes against Venezuelan vessels in the Caribbean, killing over 200 people. Narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and illegal migration are frequently cited, often referred to under the term “narco-terrorism”. These concerns provide a security framework for expanding U.S. influence in the region, similar to how anti-communism shaped Cold War-era interventions.
Beyond these confrontations, Washington also exercises influence through governments more aligned with U.S. objectives. Trump maintains close political alliances with Argentine President Javier Milei and El Salvador President Nayib Bukele. Milei shifted away from BRICS in favor of closer economic ties to the U.S. Bukele's alliance with the U.S. is centered on mass deportation strategies—for example, when he opened the doors of El Salvador's mega-prison, CECOT, to hundreds of deportees sent by the Trump administration.
Taken together, these developments suggest a broad evolution in international politics, one where superpowers maintain competing regional domains, as China curates its own hemispheric sphere of influence in Taiwan and the South China Sea.